1 Forthcoming in Justino, P., Brück, T. and Verwimp, P. For a long time, research on the causes of violent conflict focused on the mediation and resolution of conflicting interests between governments and opposing groups, 2 while studies on its consequences have concentrated on estimating the costs that wars impose on countries. 3 2 See Hirshleifer (2001), Garfinkel (1990) and Skaperdas (1992) at the theoretical level, and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) at the empirical level. This literature is reviewed in Blattman and Miguel (2010).
Introduction
Violent conflict is arguably one of the most important challenges facing the world today. The incidence of international and civil wars has decreased in recent years (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009 ), but the legacy of violence persists in many countries, affecting the effectiveness of global development, international peace and democracy-building processes worldwide, as well as disrupting the living conditions of local populations, often for generations. Yet, we have limited rigorous evidence of how people live in contexts of conflict: what choices they make, how institutional arrangements impact on and are affected by these decisions, and what policies may work in strengthening peace and post-conflict development processes. This lack of systematic understanding of the interplay between violent conflict and development has limited the effectiveness of policy interventions, and weakened processes of state-and peace-building in areas affected by conflict and violence.
For a long time, research on the causes of violent conflict focused on the mediation and resolution of conflicting interests between governments and opposing groups, 2 while studies on its consequences have concentrated on estimating the costs that wars impose on countries. 3 2 See Hirshleifer (2001), Garfinkel (1990) and Skaperdas (1992) at the theoretical level, and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) at the empirical level. This literature is reviewed in Blattman and Miguel (2010) .
3 For instance, Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) , Brück, de Groot and Bozzoli, (2012) , Brück, de Groot and Schneider (2011) , Knight, Loayza and Villanueva (1996) , Collier (1999) and Stewart and FitzgGerald (2001) .
Programmes of conflict resolution have also typically been driven by concerns with state security and state capacity (UN 2004 (UN , 2005 . This perspective has come under criticism for its insufficient consideration of the role of local conflict dynamics in the outbreak and duration of civil wars, and the impact of armed conflicts on the lives of individuals, households and communities affected by violence (Autesserre 2011; Justino 2012a; Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud 2008; Verwimp, Justino and Brück 2009) .
While research at more aggregate levels has been important in advancing our understanding of global patterns that may drive or trigger violent conflict, as well as informing research and policy on the global costs of conflict, it has been less useful for uncovering mechanisms that may explain sub-national patterns of conflict (for instance, why conflict happens in some communities or regions but not others), variation in types, forms and consequences of violence (for instance, why some people are targeted by armed groups, or why some wars are very brutal while others are less so), and variation in the consequences of violent conflict (for instance, why and how some groups and regions benefit from the institutional transformation effected by violent conflict, while others lose out).
At a fundamental level, the factors that explain the outbreak, the continuation, the end and the consequences of violent conflict are closely interrelated with how people behave, make choices and interact with their immediate surroundings, and how all these factors may shape the lives and livelihoods of those exposed to conflict and violence. This volume makes the argument that individuals, households, groups and communities are at the centre of processes and dynamics of violent conflict. Understanding these processes is critical, shaping how we support institutional, 4 social, political and economic capacity in areas of violent conflict, identify factors leading to the success or failure of conflict prevention measures, and improve options for conflict mediation, prevention and resolution. To that purpose, this volume presents a collection of in-depth analyses that resulted from a major five-year research programme -MICROCON -funded by the European Commission under its 6 th Framework Programme. 4 The main contributions of this volume -and of the MICROCON programme in general -are reform efforts in post-conflict contexts. We hope that this volume will convince and inspire researchers and policy makers to place people affected by violent conflict at the heart of their thinking.
Towards a micro-level perspective on violent conflict: an analytical framework
Addressing violent conflict from a micro-level perspective implies finding answers to three fundamental questions: What does violent conflict mean at the micro level? Why do violent conflicts take place, and who are the actors involved in them? How does violent conflict impact on individuals, their families and their social groups, and how may these changes affect the course of the conflict? The answers to these questions constitute what we define in this volume as the micro-foundations of violent conflict. These answers, we argue, will allow us to better understand why violent conflicts start, persist, end or re-ignite, why peace agreements, recovery programmes and demobilisation processes sometimes work, but sometimes do not, and why some regions and countries recover from conflict but others find themselves in persistent cycles of violence and suffering. The answers to these questions are discussed briefly below, and 6 addressed in more detail in Parts I, II and III of this volume, respectively. Part IV deals with the policy implications of these answers. While this definition stays close to existing typologies of conflict, the micro-level perspective adopted in this volume departs from the existing literature in four fundamental ways: (i) the core unit of analysis, (ii) the focus on the violence, (iii) the notion of a continuum between conflict and peace, and (iv) the focus on the breakdown of the social contract as the underlying condition for the emergence of violence. These four elements have, in turn, wide implications for how violent conflict and its causes and consequences can be understood and measured. Below, we discuss briefly these key concepts. We discuss also the issue of measurement of the dynamics of conflict, violence and development from a micro-level perspective, central to all the chapters in this volume.
Unit of analysis
The core units of analysis common to all chapters in this volume are the individual, the 
The violence in violent conflicts
As emphasised in the groundbreaking analysis of civil wars by Stathis Kalyvas (2006) , the notion of violence is central to understanding violent conflict from a micro-level perspective.
There is a relationship between the idea that conflict reflects a societal and economic disequilibrium (a temporary condition) and the tendency to treat incidents of mass violence as irrational or emotional. As argued in a large literature on political violence, conflict is normal and rational (Keen 1998 (Keen , 2000 , and may be in many settings part of a social equilibrium (Lubkemann 2008) . Social choices, development processes and political change are inherently conflictual processes because the status quo will always benefit some sectors of society, while any proposed reforms will benefit other sectors (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) . One of the main aims of this volume is to better understand the conditions under which social, economic or political conflict is managed or addressed through the use of violence, and how organised violence is used as a strategic choice to achieve particular objectives concerning the way in which society and politics are organised and power is distributed (Justino 2012a (Justino , 2012b .
Some forms and episodes of violence may be perceived to be legitimate, while others will be seen as illegitimate. In many situations, the legitimacy of an act of violence is open to debate. 
The breakdown of the social contract
One last pillar in the micro-level approach to the analysis of violent conflict is the recognition that violence only emerges in very specific circumstances. Some societies, despite having conditions pre-disposing them to violent conflict, such as horizontal inequality, polarisation and natural resource rents, do not descend into conflict. There must hence be other institutional factors at work. Cuesta and Murshed (2008) and Addison and Murshed (2001) define these factors overall as the weakening or breakdown of the social contract. The social contract incorporates the institutional mechanisms that allow for peaceful conflict resolution, and it can break down when there is a contest over the monopoly of violence by the state, the protection and security of citizens, and the legitimate right to define and enforce property rights (in the broad, institutional sense) and the rule of law in a given territory.
In general, violent conflict is unlikely to take hold if a country has a framework of widely-agreed 
A micro-level perspective on the causes of violent conflict
The macro-level perspective on conflict analysis that has dominated the conflict literature has been particularly effective at generating understanding of global patterns that may drive or trigger violent conflict. This lens has been less useful for gaining a better understanding of who are the real actors in the outbreak and continuation of violent conflicts, and why some individuals and groups participate in violent acts, while others do not. Individual motivations There are at least five potential micro-behavioural channels that may explain the correlation between low GDP and violent conflict. The first is the low opportunity cost of fighting:
individuals that are unable to find regular employment may be attracted by the opportunities offered by rebel groups and other organised armed groups. Second, this explanatory model can also capture greed-and grievance-based motivations. Even when individuals hold jobs, they may still join armed groups because they may anticipate earning more at the end of a successful fight (greed). Third, individuals may join armed groups because they are discontent with the way society and the economy is organised through the current government (grievance). Fourth, the relationship between low GDP and the outbreak of civil wars may also result from the fact that poor countries in general have low capacity to protect civilians against violence, but also to suppress armed struggle. Hence, joining armed groups may have to do with the need of individuals to protect themselves and their families, because they realize that the government is unable or unwilling to do so. Finally, the decision to join armed groups may also be consistent with the belief that the government is too poor to defeat armed rebellion and, therefore, individuals do not have to fear the government if they join armed groups. Thus, one type of behaviour -joining an armed movement -may be consistent with at least five micro-foundations, all in turn consistent with the widely observed macro-level correlation between conflict onset and low GDP per capita. Which of these five (or more) explanations is correct (and there can be more than one at work at the same time), makes a large difference to how policy interventions should be designed to effectively prevent or mitigate violent conflict. For example, if the main motivation to join a rebel group is the security concern for individuals and their families, then a policy of counter-insurgency will be counterproductive, because individuals would then feel even more insecure. In this case, a cautious approach to increase security in the area, including the provision of law and order against common crime, will be more effective in reducing the appeal of an armed movement.
Distinguishing between the different mechanisms that underlie individual, household or group motivations to participate in violence requires the theorisation of violence as a behavioural choice, with its own costs and benefits, and determined by a set of institutional, cultural, social, economic and political factors. Whereas traditional explanations have mostly focused on one factor (either greed or grievance) to explain individual participation in violence, the micro-level perspective identifies the often complex and multiple motivations involved in the behavioural choice. This approach is supported by recent evidence at the micro level which documents the multiplicity of motivations and the interaction between them (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Guichaoua 2007 Guichaoua , 2010 Weinstein 2006 ). This point is developed further in the chapter by Yvan Guichaoua.
Individual motivations must also be examined within the context of group belonging. A large fraction of recent violent mass conflicts across the world have been attributed to clashes originating from opposing interests or perceived injustices between different religious, cultural or ethnic groups (e.g. Horowitz 1985; Gurr 1970 Gurr , 1993 Stewart 2000 Stewart , 2009 Stewart , 2011 Marshall 2005) . This is, however, the subject of a large debate. On the one hand, cross-national empirical analyses of the causes of civil wars have found no statistical evidence for a relationship between inequality and civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Bircan, Brück and Vothknecht 2010) . On the other hand, a significant number of studies have highlighted the importance of grievances as causes of armed conflict, measured in a variety of ways including vertical inequality (of incomes and assets such as land) (Maystadt 2008; Muller 1985; Muller and Seligson 1987; Wickham-Crowley 1992; Schock 1996) , class divides (Paige 1975; Scott 1976) , inequalities in access to power decisions (Richards 1996) inequalities (Tilly 1998 ) and ethnic fragmentation (Easterly and Levine 1997; Elbadawi 1992 ).
The debate is inconclusive with respect to the role of inequality as a cause of armed conflict, but is converging towards the view that although levels of inequality may not be a sufficient condition to trigger violent conflict (after all most societies exhibit forms of inequality), they may be instrumental to the organisation of collective violence. The mechanisms explaining a potential relationship between inequality and violent conflict are, however, not well-understood.
This gap is addressed in the chapter by Frances Stewart, where the central role of horizontal inequalities between population groups in the outbreak and duration of various types of violence -riots, communal violence, civil wars, genocide and global terrorism -is strongly highlighted.
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Although there is a large literature that relates mass organised violence with high levels of ethnic and religious fragmentation (e.g. Easterly and Levine 1999; Bates 1999) and polarization (Esteban and Ray 1991) , it is not clear how ethnicity is associated with outbreaks of conflict.
Indeed, most multi-ethnic societies live relatively peacefully (Fearon and Laitin 1996) . An individual's utility may however be related to his or her identity, in which case individual and group well-being could be inseparable ( 
Violent conflict and health outcomes
Violent conflicts lead to severe and long-term effects on health outcomes. These include warrelated deaths, civilian deaths, injuries, ill-health and severe psychological damage. These effects are often aggravated by the breakdown of health and social services (which increases the risk of disease transmission), the destruction of infrastructure such as roads and public utilities, the loss of social capital and political trust (Grein et al. 2003) , and the already precarious situation of 9 Justino (2009 ) outline the conceptual framework adopted in MICROCON to analyse the relationship between conflict, violence and poverty outcomes at the micro-level. Brück, Naudé and Verwimp (forthcoming) discuss how conflict affects entrepreneurs and small-scale firms in developing countries. . This research has also suggested that improving the health of those affected by conflict is not only valuable in its own right, but may also be of instrumental importance to the prevention of violent conflict (Krug et al. 2002) . These key arguments are further developed in the chapter by Chiara Altare and Debarati Guha-Sapir. 
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